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On Imperfect Competition with Occasionally
Binding Cash-in-Advance Constraints
Huw Dixon Panayiotis M. Pourpouridesy
July 11, 2016
Abstract
We provide a theoretical demonstration of the link between imperfect competition
and the cash-in-advance constraint, not previously considered in the literature. In a
general equilibrium framework, we show that imperfect competition a¤ects the propor-
tion of times that the cash-in-advance constraint binds. As the market becomes more
competitive it is certainly no less likely that the cash-in-advance constraint will bind.
Therefore, economic welfare changes not only because of the direct e¤ect of the change
in the distribution of aggregate consumption but also because of the indirect e¤ect of
the cash-in-advance constraint. Other implications are also demonstrated.
JEL Classication Codes: D4; D5; E3; E4
Keywords: cash-in-advance; general equilibrium; monopolistic competition; im-
perfect competition; money velocity
1 Introduction
In this paper, we depart from the assumption of perfect competition in the nal output sec-
tor, commonly used in cash-in-advance (CIA) models, and show that imperfect competition
a¤ects the proportion of times that the cash-in-advance constraint binds.1 It follows that
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1Cash-in-advance models continue to be widely used in monetary economics, e.g. Evans et al. (2007),
Devereux and Siu (2007), Díaz-Giméneza et al. (2008), Hromcová (2008), Alvarez et al. (2009), Giraud and
Tsomocos (2010), Adão et al. (2011), Telyukova and Visschers (2011), Burkhard and Maußner (2015). Some
of these papers mainly focus on the case of a binding CIA constraint and constant velocity of money.
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the degree of imperfect competition has both direct and indirect implications on aggregate
welfare. While the distribution of consumption between prots and wages is a¤ected directly,
the level of output and work e¤ort are a¤ected indirectly via the CIA constraint. We demon-
strate that for a given level of technology, as the market becomes more competitive not only
the share of workers in aggregate consumption increases, it is also certainly no less likely
that the CIA constraint will bind. As a result, the degree of imperfect competition indirectly
a¤ects aggregate welfare given that an equilibrium that occurs at a binding CIA constraint
is always welfare inferior to an equilibrium that occurs at a non-binding CIA constraint for
any given level of technology. These results are obtained in a general equilibrium framework
with endogenous production, fully exible prices and general assumptions about the velocity
of money.
As is well known, the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint creates a transactions demand for
money even though money provides no direct utility.2 In most papers, the CIA constraint on
consumption is assumed to be always binding.3 This assumption is justied if the empirical
correlations between consumption and money are relatively high.4 The empirical evidence
however suggests that these correlations are relatively low (e.g. 0.3 for Italy  Ragot (2014)).5
In this paper, we develop a general theoretical framework where the periods where the CIA
2This was the rationale behind the rst general formulation of the CIA constraint in Grandmont and
Younes (1972).
3Among others, see Cooley and Hansen (1996), Evans et al. (2007), Chen and Li (2008), Díaz-Giméneza
et al. (2008).
4Burkhard and Maußner (2015) assume that only a fraction of nominal consumption is subject to the
CIA constraint. Their calibration suggests that this fraction is 82%.
5Binding nancial constraints for R&D investment may indicate weak empirical support to binding CIA
constraints on consumption. It is reasonable to expect that if the latter were binding then it is likely that the
former would have been binding as well. The empirical literature provides inconclusive evidence of the link
between R&D investment and nancial constraints (see Hall and Lerner (2010) for a summary). A recent
paper by Brown et al. (2013), nd little evidence of binding nancial constraints on R&D.
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constraint binds and the periods where it does not are determined endogenously. In the
existing literature, there are only a few papers which allow for endogenously occassionally
binding CIA constraints, and these are all numerical simulations (e.g. Devereux and Siu,
2007). Whether the CIA constraint binds in a particular period depends on expectations
of risk-averse consumers about the future relative value of money as well as the degree of
imperfect competition. We allow for a very general set of possibilities about how the velocity
of money is determined, and show that velocity always has a specic upper bound which
depends on the markup of the marginal product of labor over the real wage. Money can
have real e¤ects without requiring the presence of other physical assets or restrictions on
how assets are used for transactions.6 Although nominal wages and prices are fully exible,
there are cases where prices exhibit a sluggish response to a change in money supply.
In section II we illustrate the scope of the model by looking at the case of perfect fore-
sight: although it removes the precautionary/bu¤er-stock demand for money, there is still
a potential role for money over and above the current transactions demand. We are able
to provide conditions relating to whether the current CIA constraint binds or not in terms
of the current growth in the money supply or ination and productivity growth. Among
others, we show that in a zero-ination steady state, the CIA constraint always binds. Since
utility is higher in the steady-state with the nonbinding CIA constraint, it follows that the
optimum ination rate here is negative which has obvious similarities to the Friedman (1969)
argument for a negative ination rate made in the context of a money in the utility function
6Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) note that a standard argument for money non-neutrality in general
equilibrium lies on the existence of other real assets. Changes in the money supply a¤ect the price level which
in turn a¤ects the return of money as an asset relative to the other physical assets. As a result, individuals
realign their portfolios and the equilibrium holdings of physical assets change. Within this framework general
equilibrium models require heterogeneous beliefs or other frictions.
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approach.
We argue that a monetary authority would not necessarily avoid expanding the money
supply because there are cases where it might be welfare improving. The monetary authority
decides the transfer of money prior to the realization of technology and velocity shocks, and
thus, the transfer may be optimal ex-ante but not optimal ex post. To keep our analysis
simple and tractable since the focus is the e¤ect of monopolistic competition, we abstract
from the presence of physical assets such as capital. Focusing on an economy with primitive
nancial structure also enables us to demonstrate the direct e¤ects of money, rather than
those arising from portfolio choice.7 In section III, we provide a discussion about how the
introduction of real assets such as capital and bonds might inuence the results.
Here we establish analytically the argument of Cooley and Hansen (1989), that ... the
most important inuence of money on short-run uctuations are likely to stem from the
inuence of the money supply process on expectations of relative prices. When the CIA
constraint is nonbinding, the economy is at its e¢cient output with the Classical feature
that money is neutral. This happens when the expected value of money equals its current
value, so that consumers are indi¤erent between spending a unit of money today and holding
it for one period. However, when particular state vectors occur, the CIA constraint binds
because the agents expect that the relative value of money will decrease. As a result, they
rush to spend all their money holdings the current period which leads to an increase in the
velocity of money to the extent that it hits its upper bound. In this case, there is a unique
equilibrium where money induces real e¤ects. The transmission mechanism for money to
7The assumption that money is the only asset in the economy is not an unusual one in the literature: e.g.
Lagos and Wright (2003), Lagos and Rocheteau (2005).
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have real e¤ects is the presence of the CIA constraint, through which the level of the price
has a direct e¤ect on consumer demand. This can be viewed as a type of Keynesian e¤ective
demand mechanism. Furthermore, we show that (for given technology) the level of output,
hours worked and consumption is less when the CIA binds. This ine¢ciently low level of
output occurs because the binding CIA constraint distorts the intra-temporal work-leisure
decision and discourages work.
Alvarez et al. (2009), consider a CIA economy where production is exogenous and output
is modelled as a stochastic endowment process. Their assumption that households are re-
stricted from using funds from interest-bearing accounts for consumption purposes in every
period prevents the CIA constraint from binding at all times thus allowing the velocity of
money to vary. A direct implication of this is that prices respond sluggishly to changes
in money supply because aggregate velocity decreases after an injection of money. They
motivate this feature by presenting correlations between velocity and measures of money
that exhibit a negative relationship. Chiu (2007), on the other hand, provides evidence that
cross-country correlations between money and velocity for the OECD countries are all signif-
icantly positive. We argue that by merely looking at aggregate correlations in the data, one
cannot safely draw conclusions about the direction of the e¤ect of money growth on velocity
because velocity is driven by other factors as well. It is possible that money velocity exhibits
an overall negative relation with money growth despite the fact that an increase in money
supply on its own has a positive e¤ect on velocity. Another strand of the literature focuses
on nominal rigidities of one kind or another which result in real e¤ects of monetary policy
5
in the short-run.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the economic
environment which includes the problem of the rms, the problem of the workers and the
analysis and discussion of the equilibrium conditions. In section 3 we look at the special
case of perfect foresight and section 4 briey examines how the introduction of capital and
bonds might inuence our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Economy
The economy is populated by risk averse workers and monopolistic rms which are owned by
risk-neutral entrepreneurs.9 There are incomplete nancial markets which mean that there
is no source of insurance for workers. There is a perfectly competitive labor market and a
goods market where the workers and the rms trade labor services and the nal good. The
agents exchange goods and labor services using cash which is the only medium of exchange.
As the quantity theory of money indicates, at the aggregate level, nominal output varies
with the nominal money balances times its velocity:
M tqt  Ptyt; (1)
where M t is the total quantity of money, qt is the velocity of money, Pt is the aggregate
price level and yt is the aggregate real output. Aggregate output is dened in terms of
8This is the case in the neoclassical synthesis framework (e.g. Don Patinkin 1956) and also the new
neoclassical synthesis (e.g. Woodford 2003).
9The assumption of risk-neutrality for the entrepreneurs is not essential but simplies the exposition.
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consumer preferences over the outputs xi  0 of n > 1 rms with corresponding price pi. Let
x, p 2 <n+ denote the n vectors of outputs and prices. Preferences over x are represented
in their dual form with the homothetic unit cost (price) function. We take as an example
the Linear-Homothetic (LH) preferences whose properties are described and derived in full
in Datta and Dixon (2000, 2001) : but note that the results of the paper would hold for CES
and other standard Homothetic preferences.10 The LH cost function.is:
P (p) = +  (  s) ; (2)
where
 =
Pn
i=1 pi
n
, s =
Pn
i=1 p
2
i
n
 1
2
;
and  > 1;  is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand when the prices of all rms are
equal (i.e pi = s =  = P ). Aggregate nominal expenditures are dened as Y =
Pn
i=1 pixi.
Applying Shephards lemma to (2) we can write the share for good i in total expenditures
as pixi=Y = (@P=@pi)(pi=P ). The latter yields the Marshallian demand function xi(p):
xi(p) =
(1 + )Y
nP
 
Y
nPs
pi:
The inverse demand curve is then
pi=
(1 + ) s

 
snP
Y
xi:
10In fact, the results of this paper hold for any homothetic preferences which satisfy the property that the
own-price elasticity is non-decreasing in own price as shown in Coto-Martinez and Dixon (2003).
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Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), if we assume that n is large and rms treat the aggregate
price level as given (i.e. the indexes P and s) along with aggregate nominal output, this yields
the linear demand function pi = p(xi) = A   Bxi where coe¢cients A and B correspond
to [(1 + )=]s and snP=Y , respectively and are the same for all rms. LH preferences
have the property that the rms demand curve is linear in its own price treating the general
price indexes as given (as in monopolistic competition). The assumption of monopolistic
competition is very reasonable in a macroeconomic context, where any individual rm is
small relative to the whole economy. In terms of (1), nominal income, Y , is determined
by the money supply and velocity, and real output is nominal income divided by the price
index (2) and hence the corresponding outputs of rms x.
2.1 Firms
Each rm produces output by employing a xed number m  1 of workers. Each worker
employed by a rm provides hi hours of work, which produces output via the linear technology
xi(hi;m; ) = mhi, where  > 0 is an exogenous productivity shock common to all frims.
The latter is distributed according to the conditional p.d.f. #(e; 0) for e 2   <+ where
0 denotes the previous period realized value of . The objective function of rm i can be
written as
i = p (xi) xi   Pwmhi; (3)
where i are prots and w is the real hourly wage rate. The problem of the rm is to
maximize its prots by choosing hours, taking as given the aggregate price level and the real
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hourly wage rate. The necessary and su¢cient condition for prot maximization is
p (xi)

1 +
1
"xipi

= Pw (4)
where "xipi is the elasticity of demand for rm i.
We can solve (4) for the labor demand function, nominal price, and nominal prots per
rm as a function of the aggregate variables (A;B; P; w; ):
hdi =
1
2Bm
h
A  P
w

i
; pi =
1
2
h
A+
w

P
i
; i =
1
4B
h
A  P
w

i2
: (5)
Since rms face the same technology shock , the equilibrium will be symmetric and all
rms will set their price equal to P . Then, the nominal price equation reduces to w = =,
where  = =(   1) is the markup of the marginal product of labor over the real wage.
Labor demand reduces to hd = y=nm while real prots per rm reduce to  = y=n.
Aggregate prots are then  = ni with the share of total prots in output being 
 1 < 1.
Since all prots are consumed by entrepreneurs, it follows that total consumption by worker-
households is equal to (1   1) y.11 That is, the share of consumption by worker-households
is determined by the elasticity of demand, with a higher consumption share with a higher
elasticity. Whilst we are interested in the e¤ects of monopolistic competition, it is in no way
essential for the non-neutrality of money in this model: non-neutrality of money due to
binding CIA constraints is if anything more likely to occur if there is perfect competition
and all income takes the form of wages.
11Note that the market becomes more competitve as  inceases and/or as n increases.
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2.2 Consumption and Worker-Households
Time is discrete and innite, t 2 Z+ = f1; 2:::1g. There are (n x m) worker-households
with preferences over leisure, l, and a Linear Homothetic subutility consumption, c(c) which
is dened over the households consumption of the n goods c 2 <n+, and is represented in
its dual form by (2). The utility function of a representative worker-household is given by
u(ct; lt) = ln ct +  ln lt where  > 0. We can think of the household solving a two stage
budgeting process: rstly choosing total consumption, c, given price P; and secondly allo-
cating this across the n products given prices pi. Each worker-household is endowed with
one unit of time which is split between work and leisure that is, l + h = 1. All worker-
households are identical and face the same prices, so we shall model them as a representative
worker-household (thus avoiding the need for a household subscript and aggregation). En-
trepreneurs have exactly the same subutility function over the consumption of rms output
as do worker-households. However, their utility is linear in the subutility ue(ct) = c
e
t , which
with discounting means that entrepreneurs want to spend all of their prot income on con-
sumption in each period. The entrepreneurs face no CIA constraint. We will henceforth
describe in detail the worker-households problem, and simply note that by market clearing
the consumption of the entrepreneurs is equal to prots and given by cet = xt  mct.
The worker-households wealth constraint is given by
M ct+1 + Ptct =M
c
t + t + Ptwtht; (6)
where M c 2 <+ are the households nominal money holdings,  is a money increase or
10
decrease such that M c > jj and Ptct =
Pn
i=1 pticti. The transfer t is made at the end of
period t 1 and before t is realized. It takes a while for the transfer to be completed but the
timing is such that the money is available at the beginning of the period. Households treat 
as a random variable that is distributed according to (e;  0) for e 2 N where  0 denotes the
previous period transfer and N = fe 2 < :  +M c > 0g. The household receives its labor
earnings at the end of the period but purchases consumption at the beginning of the period.
As a result, it faces a cash-in-advance constraint:
Ptct M
c
t + t: (7)
The problem of the household is to choose consumption, labor supply and money balances
to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint and the CIA constraint. We will say
that the CIA constraint is binding whenever Ptct = M
c
t + t. It is weakly binding when
the household does not wish to consume more; it is strictly binding when the household is
constrained to consume less than it would like to in the absence of the CIA constraint.
The Bellman equation associated with the households problem is the following:
V (M ct ; t) = maxfu (ct; lt) + EtV
 
M ct+1; t+1

 1t

M ct+1 + Ptct  M
c
t   t   Ptwtht

  2t [Ptct  M
c
t   t]g;
where  is the discount factor, 1t is the shadow price of the standard budget constraint and
2t is the shadow price of the CIA constraint.
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This yields the following necessary and su¢cient rst-order conditions:
uc (ct; lt) = 1tPt + 2tPt; (8)
ul (ct; lt) = 1tPtwt; (9)
1t = Et f1t+1 + 2t+1g : (10)
Notice that in equilibrium, M ct =Mt. Combining (8), (9) and (10) yields
ul (ct; lt)
wt
= Et

uc (ct+1; lt+1)
1 + gpt+1

;
where gpt = Pt=Pt 1 1 denotes the ination rate in period t. If the CIA constraint does not
bind or is only weakly binding in period t (2t = 0), the left-hand side of the above condition
is also equal to the marginal utility of consumption, which implies that the marginal benet
of work will equal the marginal cost of work, i.e. uc (ct; lt) wt = ul (ct; lt). On the other hand,
if the CIA constraint is strictly binding (2t > 0) then the marginal benet of work will be
greater than the marginal cost of work, i.e uc(ct; lt) wt > ul(ct; lt). Using the fact that utility
is separable in consumption and leisure, it is straightforward to show that money demand is
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governed by12
Et

uc (ct+1)
uc (ct)

1
1 + gpt+1
8>><
>>:
< 1, binding CIA constraint
= 1, nonbinding CIA constraint
: (11)
The term [1= (1 + gpt+1)] is the gross return of money, R
M
t+1  1 + r
M
t+1.
13 The left hand side
of the above condition can also be written as Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

, where  t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor or pricing kernel which is equal to the intertemporal rate of substitution
between next period consumption and current consumption. The term on the left hand side
of (11) is the expected return of money measured in next periods utility per unit of current
utility (i.e. the expected relative value of money). When consumers expect that the relative
value of money will decrease (i.e. Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

< 1), they spend all their money holdings
the current period and the CIA constraint binds, otherwise (if Et

 t+1R
M
t+1

= 1) they keep
some cash for next period and the CIA constraint does not bind. In the latter case, the
agents are indi¤erent between spending a unit of money today and holding it for one period
whereas in the former case, the agents strongly prefer to spend it today.
Dividing (8) over (9) yields:

ct
1  ht
=
1t
1t + 2t
wt: (12)
12This is the same condition governing money demand in Alvarez et al. (2009). In their model, the
condition holds with strict equality when the household carries a strictly positive balance of money in its
bank account into next period. The latter is equivalent to a non-binding CIA constraint in our model.
Using the logarithmic utility function, the left hand side of (11) can also be written as Et[Ptct=Pt+1ct+1] =
Et[1=(1 + gpt+1) (1 + gct+1)] where gc denotes the growth rate of consumption.
13Note that rM =  gp= (1 + gp) is non-positive as long as ination is strictly non-negative.
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When 2t = 0 and the CIA constraint for that period is not binding or weakly binding,
this is the usual intra-temporal condition which states that the marginal rate substitution
(MRS) between leisure and consumption equals the real wage. However, when the CIA
constraint is strictly binding with 2t > 0, the MRS is lower than the real wage, so that for
given consumption the labor supply ht is lower.
14 Consumption will be lower as well when
2t > 0 (the income e¤ect) which will tend to increase ht, but since the real wage remains
constant the overall e¤ect on the labor supply is negative. One way of understanding the
leisure-consumption distortion when the CIA constraint binds is that the household switches
from consumption which is constrained by CIA to leisure which is not: the CIA in e¤ect
acts as a tax on consumption.
We can see that the behavior of the household divides into two regimes. In one regime
(CIA constraint nonbinding or weakly binding) 2t = 0 and the household behaves in the
standard way (it can demand and supply as much as it wants to at market prices and wages).
In the other regime 2t > 0, the household is constrained in its ability to consume at the
prevailing price: it would like to consume more given the price, but is unable to do so. This
is an e¤ective demand constraint : with a CIA constraint, the desired consumption can only
become e¤ective if there is the cash to execute it. This spills over into the labor supply
decision, reducing the level of labor supply. There is less incentive to work now and increase
income which cannot be spent this period only to generate more cash for next period when
it is not needed. This is a very Keynesian e¤ective demand mechanism, as was found in
the earlier literature on non-Walrasian equilibria.15
14Condition (12) can be rewritten as ht = 1 (1+2t=1t)(=wt)ct so that for a given level of consumption,
labor supply is lower when 2t > 0.
15See for example Clower (1965), Leijonhufvud (1968), Benassy (1975), Malinvaud (1975). However, unlike
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2.3 Equilibrium with an Occasionally Binding CIA Constraint
In equilibrium, all rms produce the same quantity, make the same prot and all household-
consumers consume the same amount of the product purchased from each rm. Whilst we
have treated qt as given at the household level, we now need to dene the aggregate relation-
ship which determines the velocity of circulation. The latter is determined by institutional
factors such as the system of payments and the monetary policy regime () as well as the
payment habits of the society and the production technology (). To capture developments
in the system of payments and changes in the payment habits we introduce a velocity shock
't which has an initial condition '1 and the conditional p.d.f.  (e';'0) for e' 2   <+
where '0 denotes the previous period realized value of '. Then, economic fundamentals
are represented as a sequence of productivity levels, money supplies and velocity shocks
ft;Mt; 'tg
1
t=1 that evolve according to #,  and
 and the initial conditions f1;M1; '1g.
The velocity of circulation is determined by the function: qt 2 Qt:  x  x N ! (0; q
b]
which we can write as qt = q(t; 't; t); where qt is a unique potentially time variant scalar.
Thus, we allow for a very general set of possibilities about how the velocity is determined:
there is a general function which relates the velocity qt to the two shocks determining t;Mt
as well as a possible velocity-specic shock. The assumption allows for the velocity to be
constant, or to be decreasing or increasing in its arguments and there is no requirement for
smoothness or di¤erentiability. An equilibrium consists of a sequence pairs of fwt, Ptg
1
t=1
that clear the labor and the goods market given the economic fundamentals ft;Mt; 'tg
1
t=1.
Associated with fwt, Pt, t, 't, tg
1
t=1 are the sequences fqt, 1t, 2t, yt, ct, ht, tg
1
t=1.
these older papers, the phenomenon in the present model is very much dynamic and intertemporal rather
than resulting from static and ad hoc rationing constraints that arise from exogenous xed prices.
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We can characterize the equilibrium sequence by dividing it into two possible states: one
where the CIA constraint is binding, and one where it is not. Of course, how this divides up
will depend on the sequence of productivity, monetary and velocity-specic shocks. The two
extremes are that the CIA constraint is always binding, or never binding. The following
propositions allow us to determine how the economy behaves in the case of an intermittently
binding CIA constraint.
For all t, the real wage is related to the current productivity level by the markup equation,
wt = t=. The nominal price Pt thus becomes the key variable for establishing equilibrium
in each period. A useful way to sort the sequence into binding and nonbinding is to note
that there is an upper bound to the velocity of circulation.
Lemma For all t there is an upper bound qb =  on the equilibrium qt. The CIA constraint
binds at time t when qt = q
b and it does not bind at time t when qt < q
b.16
All proofs are in appendix A (published online).17 The intuition behind the Lemma is
clear. Firstly, the upper bound on the velocity comes from two sources: the CIA constraint
(7) itself, and the proportion of expenditure which is not subject to the CIA constraint
(the expenditure of entrepreneurs which equals prots). Turning to the CIA constraint, if
there were no prots ( very large) then worker-household consumption equals output and
(7) becomes Ptyt  M
c
t + t, which implies by denition that q
b = 1. However, since the
entrepreneurs spend all of their prots and are not subject to the CIA constraint, the latter
only applies to that portion of output which is consumed by workers. A higher markup
16Recall that whether the CIA constraint binds or not depends on the expectation about next periods
relative value of money (condition 11). This expectation is conditional on the current state of the economy.
17The appendix can be found in the following link: https://sites.google.com/site/panayiotismpourpourides/research
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implies a greater share of prots, and thus for a given output a lower share of consumption
by worker-households and hence a higher overall velocity is possible. For  close to 1, prots
take up nearly all output and the CIA constraint only applies to a very small proportion of
output, which allows the velocity to be very large. If the CIA constraint applied both to
workers and entrepreneurs, then the share of prots would not matter and we would have
no dependence of velocity on  : qb = 1. However, it seems more reasonable to assume
that entrepreneurs are not so constrained. Hence, this prot share e¤ect means that the
upper bound of qt is decreasing with the elasticity of demand of the consumption good (i.e.
dqb=d =  1= (   1)2 < 0) or equivalently, it is increasing with the markup of marginal
productivity over the real wage.
The Lemma enables us to partition time into two sets: times when the CIA constraint
is strictly binding, and times when it is not strictly binding that is,18 B = ft 2 Z+ : 2t >
0 and qt = q
bg and NB = ft 2 Z+ : 2t = 0 and qt  q
bg. Now, we can dene the
proportion of periods in which the CIA constraint is binding. If we dene for any T 2 Z+
B(T ) = ft 2 f1; 2:::Tg : t 2 Bg, and likewise NB(T ), we can dene the proportion of times
the CIA constraint binds until T that is, P(B; T ) = #B(T )=T . The stationarity of the
conditional distributions of ,  and ' is su¢cient to ensure that limT!1P(B; T ) = {,
where { 2 [0; 1]. The following Propositions characterize the equilibrium price level Pt when
the CIA constraint binds and when it does not, and show that for given fundamentals, the
proportion of time in which the CIA binds is non-decreasing in .
Proposition 1 (i)When the CIA constraint does not bind (t 2 NB) there is a unique equi-
18Weakly binding and nonbinding equilibria belong to the same category. Whenever we refer to binding
CIA constraints we imply the strictly binding case.
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librium where Pt = (1 + ) qt
h
Mt+t
t
i
with qt  q
b and t  , where t =

Zt(Mt+t)
,
Zt = Et
n
uc(ct+1;lt+1)
Pt+1
o
and
uc(ct+1; lt+1)
Pt+1
=
8>><
>>:
qb
q(t+1;t+1;'t+1)
1
(Mt+1+t+1)
for (t+ 1) 2 NB
1
Mt+1+t+1
for (t+ 1) 2 B
:
(ii) When the CIA constraint binds (t 2 B) there is a unique equilibrium where Pt =
(1 + t) q
b
h
Mt+t
t
i
with t > .
The interpretation of Proposition 1(ii) is that the CIA constraint binds when the expected
return on savings is su¢ciently low. Note that Zt is the discounted expected marginal utility
that $1 saved now can buy next period. When Zt is low, and hence t is high, the return to
saving is so low that the worker-household wants to spend all of its cash balances now. The
CIA constraint prevents the worker-household from borrowing to smooth its consumption
as much as it would like to. The critical value of Zt at which the CIA binds is dened in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let Zt = (Mt + t)
 1. The CIA constraint strictly binds at time t when Zt <
Zt (and hence, Zt (Mt + t) = =t < 1); and does not bind when Zt  Zt, (and hence,
Zt (Mt + t) = q
b=qt  1).
Zt is the return on savings that exactly equates the marginal utility of current con-
sumption to the expected discounted marginal utility of next-period consumption when the
household spends all of its current money balance.19 If Zt falls below this critical level, then
19With logarithmic utility, uc(ct) = (Mt + t)
 1
when all current balances are spent.
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the CIA constraint binds and the worker-household is prevented from lowering its marginal
utility of current consumption by increasing its current consumption. It is clear that this is
an intertemporal phenomenon which depends on expectations about what is going to hap-
pen next period: indeed, since the CIA constraint can bind in the future it may involve
expectations into the innite future.
Corollary 1 also indicates that the velocity of circulation is related to the expectations
about the future state of the economy via Z as qt = q
b=Zt (Mt + t). Since a current change
in money supply (t) a¤ects expectations about the future value of money (Zt), velocity can
be constant, increasing or decreasing in money supply. The direction of the e¤ect of t on
qt depends on how changes in money supply a¤ect expectations. This is consistent with our
assumptions about the functional form of velocity. For instance, if an expansionary money
supply generates expectations for a decrease in the value of money next period, then it is
possible that an increase in  causes an increase in velocity.
Corollary 2 When t 2 NB and the CIA constraint weakly binds then, Zt (Mt + t) = 1,
 = t and qt = q
b.
The implications for the CIA constraint on nominal prices and real output can be seen
if we rewrite the expression for the price level using the explicit functional forms:
Pt =

qb
t
 
(Mt + t) +

Zt

for t 2 B.
The equilibrium price level is not proportional to the current money-supply Mt + t due
to expectations =Zt > 0. To show this let t =  (t)Mt and Zt 2

; ; 

such that
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0 <  <  <  and  (t) to denote the percentage e¤ect of t on Pt. If  (t) is the
percentage e¤ect of t on =Zt such that  (t) 2

; 0; 

with  < 0 <  and = =
 
1 + 

= < = < (1 + )= = = then
 (t) =  (t)
Mt
Mt +


+  (t)


Mt +


for t 2 B.
Even if a change in money supply does not a¤ect expectations (i.e.  (t) = 0),  (t) <  (t)
because =Zt > 0. In other words, a 10% higher money-supply implies a higher price, but
one which is less than 10% higher. When a change in money supply leads to expectations
for higher absolute value of money (i.e.  (t) = ) then the percentage increase in the price
level,  (t), is even smaller than in the case of  (t) = 0. Note that if (t  1) 2 B then
 (t) is the time t ination rate which is due to the change in money supply. Therefore,
there are cases where the price level responds sluggishly to a change in money supply.
Proposition 1 also indicates that the binding CIA constraint implies a non-neutrality of
money. It is straightforward to show that output and consumption respond negatively to the
CIA constraint (see proofs of Propositions 1 and 2):
yt =
nm
1 + !t
t, ct =
yt
nmqb
, ht =
1
1 + !t
, t =
yt
n
;
where !t = t for t 2 B and !t =  for t 2 NB. The strength of the CIA constraint
is reected in how big t is (since it is inversely related to Zt). In the absence of CIA
constraint, when Zt = Zt from Proposition 1(ii) and corollary 1, we have t  ; when
the CIA constraint binds we have t > . Hence, output, employment and prots are all
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lower with a binding CIA constraint than without. This is intuitive, since the restriction of
consumption directly reduces output and hours per worker (from the production function
and labor market equilibrium) and prots (via the markup equation). Hence, if we compare
outputs in times with the nonbinding constraint (where output is at its e¢cient level yt )
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and when it is binding we have:
yt =
nm
1 + 
t = y

t for all t 2 NB and yt =
nm
1 + t
t < y

t for all t 2 B.
If we compare any two periods with the same productivity level, we can say that the
nonbinding equilibrium Pareto dominates the binding equilibrium in terms of the current
ow in utility and prots. Furthermore, we can say that if we have two periods with the
same productivity in which the CIA constraint binds, the one with the smaller t dominates
the other.
Proposition 2 (i) For any t1 2 B and any t2 2 NB such that t1 = t2 then u (t2) > u (t1)
and  (t2) >  (t1). (ii) For any t1; t2 2 B such that t1 = t2 , if t1 > t2 then
u (t2) > u (t1) and  (t2) >  (t1) :
The role of imperfect competition matters in this model because entrepreneurs are as-
sumed to be una¤ected by the CIA constraint. The proportion of expenditure in the economy
covered by the CIA constraint is increasing in the elasticity of demand (decreasing in the
markup). We can now consider two economies that are identical in terms of the economic
20Note that with the utility function assumed for the worker-household, the income and substitution e¤ects
of the real wage exactly o¤set each and there is no direct e¤ect of the degree of imperfect competition or
productivity on equilibrium labor supply. In this case, it is only the CIA constraint that can alter employment
and reduce output below its e¢cient level. As shown in Proposition 4 there is an indirect e¤ect of the degree
of imperfect competition on labor supply, operating via the CIA constraint.
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fundamentals over time, but which di¤er in the degree of imperfect competition. We can
show that the CIA constraint cannot bind for a lower proportion of the time in a more
competitive economy.
Proposition 3 Consider 1 and 2 with corresponding sequences of equilibria and resultant
{1 and {2. If 1 > 2, then {1  {2.
As the market becomes more competitive (as lim !1 q
b = 1), it is more likely that
the CIA constraint will bind (or certainly no less likely).21 It needs to be stressed that
Proposition 3 does not imply that in a perfectly competitive market the CIA constraint will
always bind. Whilst it is possible that the CIA constraint will be binding all the time and
NB = ?, it is also perfectly possible that in the competitive case the CIA constraint may
never (strictly) bind and hence B = ?. However, what is clear from the proof of Proposition
3 is that for some pairs (1; 2), {1 < {2.
Proposition 3 implies that as the market becomes more competitive, it becomes more
likely that output will be lower than its e¢cient level. Although this may sound counter-
intuitive, it is justied by the presence of the CIA constraint which a¤ects the portion of
consumption being subject to the CIA constraint. As the elasticity of demand () increases,
rms face tougher competition, and the markup they charge reduces (i.e. the monopoly
power of the rms decreases). Firm owners are made worse o¤ by increased competition be-
cause (i) their share in aggregate production decreases and (ii) aggregate production is lower
than its e¢ciency level when the CIA constraint binds. On the contrary, worker-households
21In other words, as the market becomes more competitive, the range of the set of times that the CIA
constraint does not bind, shrinks (or certainly does not expand).
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face a tradeo¤ between lower output when the CIA constraint binds and an increased share
in aggregate production. When the latter dominates the former, worker-households are
better o¤ from increased competition. Since the perfectly competitive outcome is Pareto
optimal, whilst it may be more likely that the CIA constraint will bind when there is perfect
competition, the resultant welfare loss from lower output maybe small.
We now show that monetary policy depends on the degree of competition. Two economies
characterized by di¤erent degrees of competition but identical in all other respects will
have di¤erent monetary policies, fMtg
1
t=0, unless they have di¤erent expectations about the
evolution of money supply, . For simplicity we have assumed that the transition probabilities
of money transfers depend only on the previous realization of the transfer. However, this
assumption does not play a crucial role and the analysis can be easily extended when the
transition probabilities have a more complex functional form and/or depend on other factors.
Let  denote the conditional cumulative distribution of . Then, the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 4 If for any a and b such that, when a < b, q (a) < q (b) then, for a
given sequence ft;Mt; 'tg
1
t=1, invariant probability distributions # and , and 1 and
2 with corresponding cumulative distributions 
1 and 2 such that 1 > 2:
If t (1) 2 NB then,
8>><
>>:
t (2) 2 NB only if 
1 rst-order stochastically dominates 2
t (2) 2 B only if 
2 rst-order stochastically dominates 1
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If t (1) 2 B then,
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
t (2) 2 NB only if 
1 rst-order stochastically dominates 2
t (2) 2 B
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
for 1 = 2 if 2 > THR
only if 2 rst-order stochastically dominates 1
and 2  THR;
where 0 < THR < 1, such that E
THR
1;t

 t+1R
M
t+1

= 1.
Proposition 4 shows the impact of the degree of competition on monetary policy. It
demonstrates that for invariant probability distributions # and , as the market becomes
more competitive, only within a specic range of competition (0 < 1 < 2  THR) mone-
tary policy may remain unchanged. In section II, we analyze the case of perfect foresight and
show that for low (negative) growth rates of money supply the CIA constraint does not bind
whereas whenever the CIA constraint binds the growth rates of money supply are above a
certain threashold. This motivates the assumption that velocity is an increasing function of
money transfers. If this is the case, then for a given sequence ft;Mt; 'tg
1
t=1 and probability
distributions # and , as the market becomes more competitive, it is relatively more likely
that the growth rate of money will increase when the CIA constraint does not bind and
relatively less likely that it will increase when the CIA constraint binds. Monetary policy is
optimal in the sense that given transition probabilities, the sequence of money transfers is
such that it satises the households and rms optimal conditions. If the transition prob-
abilities for money transfers are the same in the two economies with di¤erent degrees of
imperfect competition then, for each economy there will be a di¤erent sequence of money
transfers satisfying the optimal conditions.
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2.4 Discussion
Propositions 1-4 show that in this simple economy, we can divide time into two regimes.
In one, where the CIA constraint does not bind, we live in a Classical world where real
variables are given by their optimal level (conditional on technology and the presence of
monopolistic competition), prices adjust instantaneously to current shocks. In the other
regime, the CIA constraint binds, and output falls below its optimal level. Households see
the expected marginal utility of their money holdings falling to a very low level in the next
period: perhaps they expect a high nominal price next period (or a productivity boom)
and would like to increase their current consumption to lower their current marginal utility.
However, they run into the CIA constraint: markets clear, but at a lower level of output and
consumption. The nominal price that equates the cash-constrained demand with the supply
is higher than in the classical regime. Prices are perfectly exible, but in this Keynesian
regime where the CIA constraint binds there is an e¤ective demand e¤ect: the price-level
itself inuences the way the CIA operates.22 In essence, there are two forces operating in
response to the low value of expected marginal utility per $ next period: on the one hand,
the current price rises to reduce the current marginal utility per $, on the other hand the
households are trying to increase their consumption. Since the CIA constraint prevents them
from increasing consumption enough, the equilibrium market clearing nominal price is higher
than it would have been in the absence of the constraint.
Why does not the price adjust downward to avoid the CIA e¤ect and let the household
raise its current consumption su¢ciently? The answer is in the general equilibrium: the
22When the household is operating under a CIA constraint, its demand curve becomes a rectangular
hyperbola rather then the normal demand.
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maximum output that the economy can produce under voluntary trade is given by yt . With
a lower price than that given by Proposition 1(ii), the demand of the consumer would exceed
the supply. With the lower prices the worker-household would be wanting to consume more
than it was willing to produce through supplying its own labour. So higher current prices
are consistent with both the current equilibrium in goods and labor markets, and also ensure
that the inter-temporal equilibrium holds given the CIA constraint.
To make matters concrete, for illustrative purposes, let us assume that the velocity of
circulation is an increasing function of  and .23 This assumption is not short of empir-
ical support: Chiu (2007), provides evidence for the positive relationship between velocity
and money while Hromcová (2008) provides evidence for the positive relationship between
velocity and quality of technology in production. It follows that for a massive monetary
expansion or a substantial technology improvement or a combination of the two, the CIA
constraint will then bind because the agents expect that the value of money next period will
be relatively smaller. As a result, they rush to spend all their money holdings the current
period which increases the velocity of money to the extent that it hits its upper bound.
Then, equilibrium output, consumption, work e¤ort and prots, all depend on the current
money supply as well as expectations for future money transfers, technology innovations and
velocity-specic shocks.
23This is a special case of a velocity function where qt = q(t
+
; t
+
). Alvarez et al. (2009), provide evidence
that the correlation between measures of money and velocity is negative. However, this does not necessarily
imply that money supply is the dominant factor that drives velocity. This can be illustrated beyond the
context of the current model. For instance, suppose technology is the dominant factor of velocity and that it
a¤ects it positively. Then, if technology deteriorates, it is reasonable to assume that the monetary authority
increases the supply of money to boost the economy. In this case, even though money transfers a¤ect velocity
positively, overall money supply and velocity exhibit a negative correlation. Therefore, by just looking at
correlations between money and velocity we cannot safely draw conclusions about the relationship between
velocity and transfers.
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In general, a higher level of technology would imply a higher welfare. In addition, for any
given technology level, a binding CIA constraint implies a lower welfare than a nonbinding
CIA constraint (Proposition 2). A higher level of technology would also imply a higher
probability of a binding CIA constraint (under our illustrative assumption). If the CIA
constraint binds, larger money transfers will, in general, increase the welfare. The monetary
e¤ect on real quantities comes through variable . The smaller  is the higher the welfare
of both consumers and rm owners. There are two channels through which money transfers
can a¤ect , a direct channel in which there is a negative relationship between  and , and
an indirect channel (through Z) in which the direction of the relationship is not obvious
because it depends on the expectations of consumers about next periods value of money.
Assuming that the direct e¤ect of  on  dominates the indirect e¤ect, an increase in the
supply of money decreases  and thereby, increases welfare along a binding CIA constraint.
Note that when the monetary authority decides the transfer t; the values of t and 't
are not known. For a given technology innovation and velocity-specic shock the monetary
authority can increase the likelihood of a binding CIA constraint by transferring a large
amount of money to the agents. A binding CIA constraint can occur even with moderate
levels of technology. If such a case occurs then, according to Proposition 2, the welfare for
both rm owners and consumers will deteriorate.24 The monetary authority cannot entirely
prevent the CIA constraint from binding because the condition that determines a binding
CIA constraint does not depend only on  but also on  and ', which are not under the
control of the monetary authority. One may argue that the monetary authority should
24If the CIA constraint did not bind utility and real prots would have been higher at the same level of
technology.
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keep money supply constant, making zero transfers, in order to decrease the likelihood of
a binding CIA constraint. Variation in the supply of money however does not necessarily
make the consumers worse o¤. As mentioned above, there might be values of  (within
the set of equilibria with binding CIA constraints) that make the agents better o¤. In the
absence of velocity shocks, if there was no time lag between the decision of the transfer
and the realization of technology innovation then the monetary authority could have made
appropriate transfers so that the agents achieve the highest level of welfare for any realization
of . Furthermore, due to the time lag between decision from the monetary authority and
consumers receiving the transfer as well as other possible frictions there is no guarantee
that the full amount of the transfer as decided by the monetary authority will reach the
consumers. Even if the monetary authority commits to a certain sequence of transfers, the
uncertainty that consumers have about the transfers exists and is justied. Consequently, in a
stochastic environment, the monetary authority cannot achieve with certainty a non-binding
CIA constraint. In appendix B, we provide an example of welfare improving expansionary
monetary policy.
3 The Special case of Perfect Foresight
With perfect foresight, there is no role for money as a bu¤er-stock: its only potential role is as
a store of value and medium of exchange. Whilst this is very much a simple and special case,
we can see how the framework we have set up can shed light on the possibilities contained
in Propositions 1-2. For a steady-state to be possible, we have to assume that there are no
shocks: t = b; t = 0; 't = b'. Then, all real and nominal variables are assumed constant.
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Denition of zero-ination steady state: For ft = b; t = 0; 't = b'g1t=1, qt = bq,
1t = b1, 2t = b2, yt = by, ct = bc, ht = bh, wt = bw, Mt = cM , Pt = bP and t = b.
Proposition 5 At the zero-ination steady state, when  2 (0; 1), the CIA constraint always
strictly binds, with b2 > 0; bq = qb, and bP = [1 +  (2  )] bq hcMb
i
. Then, real variables
are given by: by = nm
1+(2 )
b, bc = by
nmqb
, bh = 1
1+(2 )
, b = by
n
.
So, in steady-sate with zero-ination no one will want to hold money at the end of the
period. Since consumption is constant, the discounted marginal utility of consumption next
period is always less than current marginal utility, so that with a zero rate of return on money
holdings, a $ today will always buy more utility than a $ tomorrow. This implies that the
velocity of money will always be at its upper bound. The level of output in steady-state is
less than would occur when the CIA constraint is nonbinding, but only very slightly. The
ratio of steady-state output and employment to the e¢cient level is:
by
y
=
bh
h
=
1 + 
1 + + (1  )
< 1:
Clearly, if we are dealing with quarterly data, then  = 0:995  1 and the ratio is close to
unity. For example, with  = 1; this level of discounting gives us a ratio of 0:9975. This
slight ine¢cieny is caused by the distortion of the work-leisure decision that occurs when the
CIA constraint binds: the consumption-leisure MRS is less than the real wage, so that the
supply of labor is lower (for a given level of consumption). To see why the CIA constraint
needs to strictly bind, assume instead that it was weakly binding with bq = qb and ^2 = 0:
in this case, the household could increase its utility by bringing forward some consumption
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(since  < 1) and hence, the steady-state is only sustainable with ^2 > 0.
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Now we consider the general case where consumer-households and rm-owners perfectly
foresee the evolution of the economic fundamentals f't; t; tg
1
t=1. Let gjt = (jt=jt 1)   1
denote the growth rate of variable j at time t. We turn rst to the growth rate of the nominal
money supply.
Proposition 6 In the economy with perfect foresight : (i) when t 2 B then gMt+2 >    1
but the reverse does not always hold, and (ii) when gMt+2     1, then t 2 NB but
the reverse does not always hold.
Cooley and Hansen (1989; p. 736), argue that in their model gMt+2 >  1 is a su¢cient
condition for the CIA constraint to be always binding. In our model, gMt+2 >    1 is not a
su¢cient condition because velocity is allowed to vary. Note that conditions gMt+2 >    1
and gMt+2     1 can be rewritten as gt+1 > [(Mt + t)=t](   1)   1 and gt+1 
[(Mt + t)=t](   1)   1, respectively.
26 The two conditions can also be written as t+1 >
(Mt+ t)(   1) and t+1  (Mt+ t)(   1), respectively. Since  2 (0; 1), the latter shows
that both binding and nonbinding CIA constraints are consistent with both positive and
negative money transfers.
For any T 2 Z+ [ f0g, let us dene sets eB(T ) = ft  T + 1 : t 2 Bg and gNB(T ) =
ft  T + 1 : t 2 NBg such that B(T ) \ eB(T ) = ?, B(T ) [ eB(T ) = B, NB(T ) \gNB(T ) =
?, NB(T ) [ gNB(T ) = NB, B(0) = ?, NB(0) = ?, eB(0)  B and gNB(0)  NB. In
addition, let us dene the following auxiliary sets M(T ) = ft  T + 1 : gMt+2     1g
25The Euler equation implies that  = b1=(b1 + b2) which holds only if b2 > 0 since  < 1.
26See proof of proposition 6.
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and M>(T ) = ft  T + 1 : gMt+2 >    1g. Then, using Proposition 6 and its proof we
can dene the mutually exclusive sets gNB1(T ) = t 2M(T ) : t 2 NB	 and gNB2(T ) =
t 2M>(T ) : qt+1 < qt  q
b; t 2 NB
	
such that gNB1(T ) \gNB2(T ) = ? and gNB1(T ) [
gNB2(T ) = gNB.27 The second part of Proposition 6 indicates that if the growth rate of
money is always less or equal than    1 from any t 2 Z+ onwards, the CIA constraint will
never bind again. The case ofM>(T ) = ? or gMt+2    1 with  2 (0; 1) for all t  T +1
holds only if gMt+2 >  1 for all t  T + 1.
28 Therefore, whenM>(T ) = ?, it must be that
 1 < gMt+2     1. Proposition 6(i) also indicates that it is possible that gMt+2 >    1
when t 2 gNB(T ) which occurs when t 2 gNB2(T ).
Corollary 3 In the economy with perfect foresight, for any  2 (0; 1) and any T 2 Z+[f0g :
(i) ?  eB(T ) and (ii) ?  gNB(T ).
Corollary 3 signies that there are sequences of ft; t; 'tg such that (i) the CIA constraint
never binds and (ii) the CIA constraint always binds. For eB(T ) = ?, the sequence of
money transfers, ftg
1
t=T+1, can be complemented by sequences of velocity and technology
innovations, ft; 'tg
1
t=T+1, such that
gNB2(T ) 6= ?.
Proposition 7 In the economy with perfect foresight, there are unique values for Pt, yt, ct,
ht and t such that
Pt = (1 + t) qt

Mt + t
t

with
8>><
>>:
t = t, qt = q
b and t >  when t 2 B
t = , qt  q
b and t   when t 2 NB
,
27These relationships do not necessarily hold in the stochastic model.
28If gMt+2 <  1, the positivity of money supply will be violated.
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yt =
nm
1 + !t
t, ct =
yt
nmqb
, ht =
1
1 + !t
and t =
yt
n
;
where !t =
8>><
>>:
t for t 2 B
 for t 2 NB
with t =
8>><
>>:


(1 + gMt+2) for t+ 1 2 B

qb
(1 + gMt+2) for t+ 1 2 NB
:
Since t >  when t 2 B, for a given technology level, a nonbinding equilibrium Pareto
dominates a binding equilibrium in terms of welfare for both rm-owners and household-
consumers (Proposition 2). Note that if the CIA constraint binds in period t but is expected
to be nonbinding in t + 1, the upper bound on the qb enters into t. This implies that the
degree of imperfect competition matters: a higher markup implies a higher qb, which implies a
higher output (among binding equilibria for a given technology level). A monetary authority
which is interested in maximizing welfare, will choose the ow of money in every period such
that the CIA constraint never binds. Corollary 3 indicates that this is possible since the
binding set can be an empty set.
Corollary 4 In the economy with perfect foresight, for any t 2 NB, gct+1  gt+1.
Proposition 8 In the economy with perfect foresight : (i) when t 2 NB then gpt+1 

1+gt+1
 1, but the reverse does not always hold, and (ii) when gpt+1 <

1+gt+1
 1 then
t 2 B, but the reverse does not always hold.
Corollary 4 indicates that whenever the CIA is nonbinding, the growth rate of consump-
tion next period cannot be greater than the rate of improvement in technology. As shown in
the proof of Proposition 8, when the CIA constraint binds, it is perfectly possible that the
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growth rate of consumption next period is greater than the rate of improvement in technol-
ogy. This occurs because of an increase in work e¤ort which boosts further the growth rate
of production. In this case, the gross ination rate is smaller than =(1 + gt) due to the
fact that t 1  t. From Proposition 7, the latter also implies that not only output and
consumption grow faster than the rate of improvement in technology but also real prots.
As Proposition 2 (ii) indicates, since t 1  t neither household-consumers nor rm-owners
are worse-o¤ in the transition from period t  1 to period t.
Corollary 5 In the economy with perfect foresight, (t 1) 2 NB if and only if gpt =

1+gct
 1,
otherwise (t 1) 2 B, and gpt >

1+gct
 1 : (i) If (t 1) 2 NB and t 2 NB then, gpt =

1+gt
 1
but the reverse does not always hold; (ii) If (t  1) 2 NB and t 2 B then, gpt >

1+gt
  1 but
the reverse does not always hold; (iii) If (t  1) 2 B then, gpt >

1+gt
  1 or gpt 

1+gt
  1
for any t.
Corollary 5 (i) indicates that if the CIA constraint does not bind in two consecutive
periods, the growth rate of the price level is a function only of the growth rate of technology.
Under those circumstances, as technology improves prices must be falling. Corollary 5 (i)
also demonstrates that if technology remains unchanged when the CIA constraint does not
bind in two consecutive periods, prices decline at the rate 1  .
Corollary 6 In the economy with perfect foresight, (i) If (t   1) 2 NB and t 2 NB then,
gMt+1 =

1+gqt
  1 but the reverse does not always hold; (ii) For any bundle (t   1) and t
other than f(t  1) 2 NB, t 2 NBg, gMt+1 >

1+gqt
  1 or gMt+1 

1+gqt
  1.
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Money growth on the other hand, along two consecutive nonbinding CIA constraints,
depends on the growth rate of velocity which is a function of the money transfer, technology
and velocity innovation.29 For, Z+(T ) = fT + 1; T + 2; ::1g, it is also useful to partition
time into periods of positive growth rates of technology and times of non-positive growth
rates of technology: G+(T )= ft 2 Z+(T ) : gt > 0 g and G
 (T )= ft 2 Z+(T ) : gt  0g such
that G+(T )[G (T ) = G(T ). Corollary 5 indicates that for any T 2 Z+ [ f0g and  2 (0; 1)
such that gNB(T ) = Z+(T ), (i) if G+ = Z+(T ) then, gpt < 0 for all t and (ii) if G  = Z+(T )
then gct < 0 for all t.
3.1 Inationary steady-states and the optimal rate of ination
We are now in a position to analyze non-zero-ination steady-states, which we dene as
follows:
Denition of the inationary steady-state For ft = b; t = 0; 't = b'g1t=1, qt = bq,
1t = b1, 2t = b2, yt = by, ct = bc, ht = bh, wt = bw, t = b; gMt = gpt = g^p: for all t.
In the inationary steady-state, money growth equals steady-state ination and all real
variables are constant.30 The presence of steady-state ination means that there is an ina-
tion tax: holding money to nance transactions can incur a cost as prices are rising. This
was of course implicit in Propositions 6-8. We can now state the following:
29If velocity is a continuously di¤erentiable function in all arguments then, gqt = "
q;'
t g't+ "
q;
t gt+ "
q;
t gt
where "q;it is the elasticity of velocity with respect to variable i and gt = gMt+1(1 + gMt)=gMt   1. Then,
using corollary 6(i), we can express gMt+1 as a function of gMt, g't, gt and elasticities.
30In fact we need not assume that the velocity of money is constant: if we allowed for a constant growth
rate of the velocity  1 < gq  0, then the inationary steady state would become gq + gMt = gpt = g^p.
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Proposition 9 Consider an inationary steady-state:
(i) if g^p >    1, then the CIA constraint always strictly binds, with real variables
given by Proposition 7.
(ii) if g^p =   1, then the CIA constraint never binds and the real variables are at the
e¢cient levels dened in Proposition 7.
(iii) if g^p <    1, then no steady-state exists.
Proposition 9 (i) states that output is decreasing with the level of steady-state ination:
a higher ination tax increases the distortion induced by the CIA constraint. If we dene
the welfare corresponding to a constant level of ination as the per period ow of utility in
the corresponding steady-state (and zero if there is no steady-state) then it follows that:
Corollary 7 The optimal steady-state ination rate is g^p =    1:
This result is reminiscent of Friedmans (1969) argument that the optimal ination rate
is negative. Friedman adopted a money-in-the-utility-function framework: a negative rate of
ination provides a return on money holdings su¢cient for households to hold the optimum
quantity of real balances. Here, the argument is somewhat di¤erent. The CIA constraint
distorts the economy when it binds strictly: when 2 > 0 the labor supply is diminished
and output and consumption are below their e¢cient levels. The optimum ination rate
provides a positive return to holding money which exactly outweighs the e¤ect of discounting
and allows for constant consumption without the CIA binding. This removes the distortion
induced by the CIA constraint and allows the economy to produce the e¢cient level of output
with the MRS equated to the real wage. The Lemma and Corollary 7 can be generalised to
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allow for steady state growth in output and productivity using the conditions in Corollary
5.
4 Capital and Bonds
Thus far, we have abstracted from the presence of capital accumulation and assumed that
money is the only asset in the economy. We could introduce capital into our framework by
assuming that it is owned by the worker-household and rented to the entrepreneurs. Even
in the presence of capital, money still contains a savings-based (or precautionary demand)
component. In other words, the CIA constraint can be nonbinding even in the presence
of capital. To show this, let us assume that capital is a factor of the production function
which can be written as x(ht; kt;m; i). The extended production function satises the usual
properties: xk > 0 and xkk  0 where xk and xkk denote the rst and second derivatives of
x () with respect to k. Moreover, we assume that the agents of this economy accumulate
capital which depreciates at rate . Without loss of generality we also assume that the price
of capital is the same as the price of consumption. Then, the euler condition for capital is
Et
h
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)

[(1  ) + xk(kt+1; )]
i
=
1  2t
Pt
uc(ct)
+ Et
h
2t+1Pt+1
uc(ct)

[(1  ) + xk(kt+1; )]
i : (13)
It follows that
Et

uc (ct+1)
uc (ct)

[(1  ) + xk(kt+1; )]
8>><
>>:
> 1 for t 2 NB
< 1 or  1 for t 2 B
; (14)
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while (11) is the corresponding condition for money.31 Conditions (13) and (14), demonstrate
that when there is precautionary demand for money, investment demand is low which means
that next period stock of capital is low, and as a result the marginal product of capital is
high. Subsequently, the return of capital, measured in utility units, is expected to increase.
In this case, condition (13) indicates that the left hand-side of (14) is strictly greater than
unity because there is a non-zero possibility that the CIA constraint will bind next period.
This demonstrates that even in the presence of capital, money can be used as store of value.
If household-consumers knew with absolute certainty that the CIA constraint next period
is nonbinding then, they would have increased investment demand to the point that the
expected utility return of capital equals the expected utility return of money.
Let us consider the case of a non-zero ination steady state with perfect foresight. If
we had included capital accumulation, then the return to savings would be equal to the
reciprocal of the discount rate: the optimal ination rate (Corollary 7) would mean that
money would have the same rate of return as capital. The steady-state relationship would
give a return to capital of (1 )+xk(k; ) = 1=, where xk(k; ) is the steady-state marginal
product of capital. The real return to holding one $ is 1=(1 + g^p) = 1=.
What would happen if we included interest-bearing nominal assets such as bonds? If
we assume the usual arbitrage condition between bonds and capital, these will both o¤er
the same real-return on savings equal to the (expected) marginal return of capital. This
will not alter the opportunity cost of holding money from the case of just capital and hence
will not eliminate the precautionary-demand for money in the presence of uncertainty. This
31If capital has a di¤erent price than consumption then the left-hand-side of (13) becomes
Et[

uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)

[Qt+1
Qt
(1  ) +xk(kt+1;)
Qt
]] where Qt denotes the relative price of capital.
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conclusion depends on how liquid we make bonds. If we were to make bonds perfectly liquid,
then in e¤ect bonds would become an interest bearing form of money and would eliminate the
need for non-interest bearing money. Alvarez et al. (2009) make an intermediate assumption
and allow for bonds to be liquid part of the time and allowing the CIA constraint to be
nonbinding. Insofar as bonds are not perfectly liquid, there is still a potential role for money
over and above the transactions demand.
5 Conclusion
The paper lays out a simple framework in a general equilibrium model with money where
the nal good is produced by monopolistic rms via labor services provided by risk-averse
workers. Preferences over consumption are Linear Homothetic and money is introduced by
means of an occasionally binding cash-in-advance constraint. Those preferences generate
Marshallian demands enabling any combination of equilibrium number of rms and demand
elasticity. Money is a liquidity vehicle which has real e¤ects on the economy without requiring
the presence of other real assets or any sort of price rigidity. The velocity of money is a very
general function which corresponds to the monetary policy regime, production technology,
institutional developments and payment habits.
The proportion of periods in which the CIA constraint is binding depends, among others,
on the degree of imperfect competition. We demonstrate that the CIA constraint cannot
bind for a lower proportion of the time in a more competitive economy. We show that
the degree of imperfect competition directly a¤ects the distribution of consumption across
workers and rm owners, and in conjunction with the CIA constraint, the level of aggregate
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output and work e¤ort. We enter a Keynesian world only when the expected value of money
decreases below a critical value and velocity reaches its maximum value. The latter is the
case of a binding CIA constraint which is a welfare inferior outcome for both the workers
and the rm owners as it delivers lower utility and lower real prots for any given level of
technology. We argue that even though the monetary authority can increase the probability
of a binding CIA constraint by increasing money supply, expansionary monetary policy can
be welfare improving. We demonstrate that when the CIA constraint binds there are cases
where prices respond sluggishly to changes in money supply. We also show that with perfect
foresight, there is an optimal negative steady-state ination rate as in Friedman (1969) and
consider how the introduction of capital markets t into the framework.
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